Cybersecurity
The Email Came From Our Supplier's Real Address and the Invoice Looked Right. How Do We Keep From Sending a Payment to a Criminal?
Here is how it usually goes. Picture a 28-person heating and plumbing contractor in Boardman, Ohio. The bookkeeper has paid the same Youngstown supply house every month for six years. On a Tuesday she gets an email from her usual contact there, in the same thread as last month's statement, with the same signature block and the same friendly tone. It says the supplier has moved its banking, attaches a letter on the supplier's letterhead with the new account details, and asks that this month's payment go to the new account. The invoice number is right. The amount is right. The email address is right, because it really was sent from the supplier's mailbox. She updates the vendor record and sends the payment. Three weeks later the real supplier calls to ask why the account is past due.
Nobody clicked a strange link that day. No virus ran. The firewall did its job. This is business email compromise, and it costs small businesses more money than ransomware does, usually without setting off a single alarm. This post explains how it works, why the tools you already have do not always catch it, and the specific procedures and email settings that stop it for businesses across Western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio.
What is business email compromise, in plain English?
Business email compromise (often shortened to BEC) is fraud where a criminal uses email to trick someone into sending a legitimate payment to the wrong bank account.
The important word is legitimate. The criminal is not inventing a bill out of thin air. They are redirecting money you already owe and already planned to send: a supplier invoice, a real estate closing, a payroll deposit, a customer refund. That is why it works. Everything about the request matches what the employee expected to see, except the account number.
The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center has logged billions of dollars in reported business email compromise losses every year for several years running, and small businesses make up a large share of the victims because they move real money with fewer checks than a large company has. The common versions are:
- Vendor payment change. "We have a new bank account, please update your records." The Boardman example above.
- Executive request. An email that appears to come from the owner asks the bookkeeper to send an urgent wire or buy gift cards while the owner is "in a meeting."
- Payroll diversion. An email that appears to come from an employee asks whoever runs payroll to change their direct deposit account.
- Closing or settlement fraud. New wire instructions arrive right before a real estate closing. We covered that version in our post on law firm IT support.
How does a business email compromise attack actually get into a small business?
There are two routes, and it helps to know which one you are defending against.
Route one: a real mailbox gets taken over. Someone at your company or at the company you are paying enters their email password into a fake sign-in page. The criminal logs in quietly and does not send anything right away. They read. They learn who pays whom, when invoices go out, what the letterhead looks like, and how people sign their emails. Then they set up a hidden mailbox rule so that any reply mentioning "payment," "bank," or "invoice" skips the inbox and lands in a folder the real user never opens. When a payment is coming due, they send the bank change request from the real account and intercept the replies. The real user never sees the conversation. Route two: a look-alike address. The criminal registers a domain one character off from the real one (an "rn" in place of an "m," a ".co" in place of ".com") and copies an earlier email thread into the message so it looks like a continuation. No account was broken into. It just looks right at a glance on a busy day.Notice that in both routes the compromised or imitated mailbox may not be yours. In the Boardman example the break-in happened at the supplier. Your own security could be excellent and the fraudulent email would still arrive in your inbox from a trusted, familiar address.
Why didn't our spam filter or multi-factor authentication stop it?
Because neither one is built to catch this particular attack on its own.
A spam filter looks for bad links, bad attachments, and known bad senders. A business email compromise message often has none of those. It is a plain, polite email from a real account with a PDF letter attached. There is nothing technically malicious in it to detect.
Multi-factor authentication (the code or app prompt on top of your password) is still the most valuable single protection for your own mailboxes, and every business should have it on. But it has two limits here. First, it protects your accounts, not your supplier's. Second, newer phishing kits sit between the employee and the real sign-in page and steal the session after the code is entered, which lets the criminal in without ever needing the code again. Stronger sign-in methods and sign-in policies close most of that gap, and we cover them below.
The honest summary: technology lowers the odds a great deal, but the control that stops the money from leaving is a payment procedure. You need both.
What payment procedures stop business email compromise even when the email is convincing?
These cost almost nothing and they work even when the email is perfect. Write them down, train everyone who touches money, and make it clear that no one will ever be in trouble for following them, even if it delays a payment to the owner's favorite vendor.
1. Call back on a known number. Any request to add or change bank details gets confirmed by phone, using a number from your existing vendor file or a past paper invoice. Never the number in the email, and never by replying to the email. This one step stops the large majority of attempts.
2. Two people for any change to payment details. One person enters the change in the vendor record, a second person approves it after the call-back is logged. The same rule applies to employee direct deposit changes, which should be confirmed in person or by a call to the employee's known number.
3. Two people for outgoing wires and large electronic payments. Most business banking platforms can require a second approver. Ask your bank to turn it on, and ask what other fraud controls they offer for business accounts.
4. Treat urgency and secrecy as warning signs. "It has to go today," "I am in a meeting and cannot talk," and "keep this between us" are the three phrases that show up again and again. A real vendor can wait an hour for a phone call.
5. Hold first payments to a new account. A short waiting period before the first payment to any new or changed account gives the call-back time to happen.
6. Tell your customers how you will and will not send payment changes. If you bill customers, put a line on your invoices saying you will never change bank details by email alone. That protects them from someone imitating you.
Procedures only hold if people have practiced them. Our post on what a real security awareness program looks like covers how to train and test for exactly this kind of request.
What should our email system be set up to do against business email compromise?
The procedures stop the payment. The settings below stop your own mailboxes from being the ones that get used, and they make a look-alike message easier to spot. Most small businesses in our area run Microsoft 365, and all of this is available in it, though much of it is not on by default.
- Multi-factor authentication on every mailbox, with no exceptions for the owner, shared mailboxes, or the scanner account. Where possible, use the stronger sign-in methods (an authenticator app with number matching, or a passkey) instead of text message codes.
- Sign-in rules that block the obvious. Old sign-in methods that skip multi-factor authentication should be turned off, and sign-ins from countries where you do no business can be blocked or challenged.
- No automatic forwarding to outside addresses. This is the setting criminals rely on to copy your mail out. It should be blocked for the whole organization.
- Alerts on new mailbox rules and unusual sign-ins. A new rule that moves mail containing "invoice" into an obscure folder is one of the clearest signs of a takeover, and it can be flagged the day it is created if someone is watching. That is part of what security and proactive monitoring is for.
- Spoofing protection on your domain. Three settings with unfriendly names (SPF, DKIM, and DMARC) tell other mail systems which servers are allowed to send as you, so a criminal cannot send email that appears to come from your exact address.
- An "external sender" banner and look-alike domain warnings, so a message from a near-miss domain stands out instead of blending in.
Our email security service covers the filtering and spoofing side, and Microsoft 365 administration covers the sign-in policies, forwarding rules, and alerts. If you do not know which of these are on today, that is a normal place to be, and it takes an afternoon to find out.
What do we do in the first hour if the money has already left?
Speed decides how this ends. Funds are usually moved out of the receiving account quickly, and the chance of getting anything back drops sharply after the first day or two.
1. Call your bank's fraud department immediately. Say you are reporting a fraudulent payment and ask them to attempt a recall and to contact the receiving bank. Do this before anything else, and do it by phone.
2. File a report with the FBI at ic3.gov with the payment details. The FBI has a process for working with banks to freeze funds, and it is far more effective when the report is filed fast. Report it to local police as well; your bank or insurer may ask for the report number.
3. Call your cyber insurance carrier's claim line. Many policies require prompt notice, and the carrier may bring in its own response team.
4. Have your IT provider lock down the mailbox if one of yours was involved: reset the password, sign out all sessions, remove any forwarding and hidden rules, and review the sign-in history to see how long the criminal was inside and what they could read. Do not delete the fraudulent emails. They are evidence.
5. Call the vendor or customer on a known number so they can check their own mailboxes and warn their other customers.
6. Ask whether notification is required. If a mailbox containing personal or client information was accessed, state breach notification laws in Pennsylvania and Ohio may apply, and that is a question for your attorney and your carrier.
Does cyber insurance cover a business email compromise loss?
Sometimes, in part, and often with conditions.
Many cyber policies treat a fraudulent payment under a separate section (commonly called social engineering or funds transfer fraud) with its own limit that is often much lower than the main policy limit. Some policies only pay if you followed a documented call-back procedure before sending the money, which means the procedure above is not just good practice, it can be a condition of coverage. Read that section with your insurance agent before you need it. Our post on cyber insurance requirements walks through what carriers ask about wire verification and the other controls on the application.
Go back to the contractor in Boardman. With a call-back rule in place, the bookkeeper would have phoned the supply house on the number she has used for six years, the real contact would have said "we did not change banks," and the whole thing would have ended as an odd story at lunch and a warning to the supplier that their mailbox had been broken into. That phone call takes four minutes.
MCR Business Tech Solutions helps small and mid-sized businesses across Mercer, Lawrence, Butler, Crawford, Erie, and Allegheny counties, and in Mahoning and Trumbull counties in Ohio, lock down their email and put payment verification procedures in writing. If you are not sure whether your mailboxes would flag a takeover, or you want a second set of eyes on how payments get approved, call us at 833-859-9021 or Request an IT assessment.